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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A DIGITAL CRY FOR HELP: INTERNET RADIO’S STRUGGLE TO
SURVIVE A SECOND ROYALTY RATE DETERMINATION UNDER
THE WILLING BUYER/WILLING SELLER STANDARD

RECENT DEVELOPMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 2, 2007, the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”) significantly
increased the royalty rates that Internet radio webcasters pay under § 114 of the
Copyright Act to digitally broadcast sound recordings over the Internet.1 The
new rates apply retroactively from the period of January 1, 2006 to December
31, 2010.2 The only prior determination of such royalty rates was made in
2002 by the Librarian of Congress upon recommendation from a Copyright
Royalty Arbitration Panel (“CARP”).3 In making each of these rate
determinations, the regulatory body charged with setting new rates was
required to employ the willing buyer/willing seller standard—one of various
amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976 introduced by the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”).4 Not only is this standard
flawed because it ignores traditional notions of copyright law, but the
particular way in which it has been interpreted and applied has produced
successively controversial royalty rates that many webcasters claim threaten to
drive them out of business. At stake in this controversy is the future of Internet
radio. If the fears of small and noncommercial webcasters are fully realized
and they are driven out of business by excessive royalty rates, then the
diversity that makes Internet radio an attractive alternative to today’s
homogenized AM/FM radio will likewise disappear. Accordingly, Congress

1. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed.
Reg. 24,084, 24,096 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter CRB
Determination]; 17 U.S.C. § 114 (West Supp. 2006). Note that in addition to setting rates for the
digital transmission of sound recordings, the CRB also set rates for the making of ephemeral
copies of sound recordings (often necessary for webcasting). This Recent Development will not
address the details of CRB’s ruling on this related, but separate issue.
2. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,084.
3. See Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 CFR
pt. 261) [hereinafter CARP Determination].
4. See id. at 45,243; CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,087.
427
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must address the shortcomings of the willing buyer/willing seller standard
before the current licensing period ends in 2010. Otherwise, the battle over
webcaster royalty rates will become a cyclical problem that prevents copyright
owners, webcasters, and the public from realizing the full potential of Internet
radio.
This Recent Development discusses the state of Internet radio in light of
the CRB’s 2007 rate determination under the willing buyer/willing seller
standard. Retroactive royalties, dating back to January 1, 2006, have been due
to SoundExchange since July 15, 2007.5 However, the controversy is far from
resolved. Part II of this article provides brief histories of Internet radio and
federal protection of sound recordings. Part III addresses the 2002 and 2007
royalty-rate determinations, with particular emphasis on the latter decision.
Part IV considers various criticisms of the current rate determination process,
including claims that the willing buyer/willing seller standard is flawed and
that the process is technologically biased against Internet radio. Part V
analyzes the different relief efforts currently being pursued by webcasters,
including (1) an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, (2) proposed legislation in the form of the Internet Radio
Equality Act (“IREA”) and the Performance Rights Act, respectively, (3)
direct negotiation with SoundExchange, and (4) relocating webcasting
operations abroad. Finally, Part VI concludes that the passage of legislation
like the IREA and the Performance Rights Act are necessary steps toward a
long-term solution to the present royalty rate controversy.
II. RELEVANT HISTORIES
A.

Internet Radio

Internet radio first garnered national media attention in 1993 when Internet
Talk Radio began broadcasting its weekly half-hour radio programs over the
Internet.6 At the time, the notion of unsophisticated Internet-users creating
their own Internet radio programs was still just that: a notion.7 Over the next

5. Paul Maloney, Webcasters get breathing room; CRB pushes D-day to July 15th, RAIN,
May
2,
2007,
http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/050207/index.shtml.
See
SoundExchange, Statement on Final Determination of Copyright Royalty Board on Webcasting
Royalty Rates, May 1, 2007, http://soundexchange.com (follow “News” hyperlink).
6. John Markoff, Turning the Desktop PC Into Talk Radio Medium, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1993, at A1. See also MuseumMedia.org, http://museum.media.org/radio (last visited last visited
Feb. 11, 2008).
7. Markoff, supra note 6, at D18 (“Conceivably, any Internet user could create his own
audio or video program and and [sic] make it available on the network, just as the creator of
Internet Talk Radio plans.”) (emphasis added).
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decade and a half, advancements in technology and user accessibility turned
many Internet hopes and dreams of the early 1990s into reality.8
Since those early days, Internet radio has become an increasingly popular
alternative to traditional, “terrestrial radio.”9 Commonly referred to as
webcasting, Internet radio broadcasts are typically accomplished in one of two
ways, both of which involve the non-interactive,10 continuous transmission of
digital content over the Internet using “streaming media technology.”11 The
distinction to be made is between Internet-only webcasting and simulcasting.12
The former involves broadcasting content solely over the Internet; the latter
involves broadcasting the same content contemporaneously over the Internet
and over terrestrial radio waves.13 Both types of webcasting are currently
subject to the § 114 statutory royalty rates addressed in this Recent
Development.14
Internet radio is currently the fastest-growing medium in radio. Bridge
Ratings, a radio market analysis firm in Glendale, California, estimates that
57.6 million listeners tuned in to Internet radio each week in 2006.15 With a

8. See Alex Cosper, The History of Internet Radio (2007), http://www.tangentsunset.com/
internetradio.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
9. Id. “Terrestrial radio” is common jargon for traditional, over-the-air AM/FM radio,
which is transmitted using land-based technology. Jason A. Auerbach, Note, Recording Satellite
Radio—Adapting to Modern Technology or Infringing Copyright, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 333
(2007).
10. This article is generally concerned only with non-interactive Internet radio webcasting
services. Interactive webcasting services, which allow users to control certain aspects of a
station’s programming, are also subject to § 114 performance royalties. See 17 U.S.C. § 114
(West 2006).
11. ROBERT L. HILLIARD & MICHAEL C. KEITH, THE QUIETED VOICE: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCALISM IN AMERICAN RADIO 177 (2005).
Streaming media technology enables the real time or on demand distribution of audio,
video and multimedia on the internet [sic]. Streaming media is the simultaneous transfer
of digital media (video, voice and data) so that it is received as a continuous real-time
stream. Stream data is transmitted by a server application and received and displayed in
real-time by client applications. These applications can start displaying video or playing
back audio as soon as enough data has been received and stored in the receiving station’s
buffer. A streamed file is simultaneously downloaded and viewed, but leaves behind no
physical file on the viewer’s machine.
StreamingMedia.com, Streaming Media, http://www.streamingmedia.com/glossary/term.asp?t=
streaming%20media (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
12. HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 11, at 177.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part II.B.2.
15. Bridge Ratings, Digital Media Growth Projections, http://www.bridgeratings.com/press_
08,15,07-digitalprojectionsupd.htm (comparing Internet, satellite, HD, and terrestrial radio). The
Bridge Ratings’ sample consisted of 4,541 people, twelve years of age and up, randomly
interviewed by telephone or in person at the mall, between May and July of 2007. Id. See also
Shaun Assael, Online and on the Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23 2007, at 32.
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projected annual listener growth rate of twenty-seven percent, Internet radio
could have 147.5 million weekly listeners by 2010 and more than 196 million
listeners by 2020.16 While terrestrial radio still dominates the radio market,
averaging roughly 280 million weekly listeners in 2006, its projected annual
listener growth rate is only one percent through 2020.17 Comparative
projections like these have some in the business saying that Internet radio is
terrestrial radio’s “biggest threat.”18
Crucial to Internet radio’s success is a growing feeling that “[Terrestrial]
radio has lost its ability to engage the listener in a music experience”19—a
phenomenon often attributed to a lack of variety in modern commercial
programming. In large part, terrestrial radio’s current homogeneity can be
traced back to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecom Act”).20 The
Telecom Act effectively eliminated caps on national radio station ownership
while raising caps on local station ownership.21 Thus, the Telecom Act
essentially encouraged the “unlimited national consolidation” of radio
ownership.22 According to a 2006 study, the extensive consolidation of
ownership that ensued over the following decade produced, among other
things, fewer radio companies, larger radio companies with increased revenue
and ratings concentrations, declining local ownership, concentrated network
ownership, and, ultimately, homogenized programming with fewer listeners.23
The same study found that “[j]ust fifteen formats make up 76% of commercial
programming,” and that “[r]adio formats with different names can overlap up
to 80% in terms of the songs played . . . .”24 This lack of variety has some

16. Bridge Ratings, Digital Media Growth Projections, http://www.bridgeratings.com/press_
08,15,07-digitalprojectionsupd.htm.
17. Id.
18. HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 11, at 178 (quoting David Porter of Live365); cf. Assael,
supra note 15, at 32 (stating that webcasters are spurring a new golden age in radio).
19. HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 11, at 178.
20. See DANIEL CASTRO, SENIOR ANALYST, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION FOUNDATION, INTERNET RADIO AND COPYRIGHT ROYALTIES: REFORMING A
BROKEN SYSTEM (May 2007), http://www.itif.org/files/InternetRadio.pdf; PETER DICOLA, FALSE
PREMISES, FALSE PROMISES: A QUANTITATIVE HISTORY OF OWNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION IN
THE RADIO INDUSTRY (2006), http://www.futureofmusic.org/images/FMCradiostudy06exec
sum.pdf (on file with author). See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 10 Stat. 56 (1996).
21. DICOLA, supra note 20, at 1–2.
22. Id. See also CASTRO, supra note 20, at 2 (“[B]etween 1996 and 2002 Clear Channel
Communications grew from 40 stations to 1,240 stations.”).
23. DICOLA, supra note 20, at 2–4.
24. Id. at 4.
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critics saying that “the number one threat [to terrestrial radio] is crappy music;
it’s not technology.”25
In contrast, many listeners are drawn to Internet radio specifically for its
variety in programming.26 As a medium, Internet radio currently promotes
diverse programming in several ways. First, it is significantly easier to start up
an Internet radio station than a traditional radio station.27 As a result, not only
do current webcasting ranks include “titans” such as AOL and Yahoo!, but also
NPR, college radio stations, religious and community-based broadcasters, and
hobbyists who broadcast from homes and workplaces.28 Second, unlike
terrestrial radio, Internet radio is not limited by the number of channels it can
make available to listeners.29 Third, Internet radio’s digital reach is far
superior to that of terrestrial radio, which is intrinsically restricted by the finite
reach of traditional analog radio waves.30 The diversity of Internet radio
programming has even garnered the attention of Congress.31 To summarize
Internet radio’s appeal:
Internet radio explodes the boundaries of radio broadcasting, opening up a
universe of stations offering far more diversity than what is available on the

25. HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 11, at 178 (quoting Jay Frank of Yahoo’s Internet radio
station, Launch).
26. See Allison Kidd, Recent Developments, Mending the Tear in the Internet Radio
Community: A Call for a Legislative Band-Aid, 4 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 339, 344 n.32 (2003)
(noting survey results indicating that the number one reason listeners tuned-in to Internet radio
was that “it provides audio content you cannot get otherwise” (quoting JOAN FITZGERALD &
LARRY ROSIN, RADIO AND E-COMMERCE: THE ARBITRON INTERNET LISTENING STUDY II 23
(1999), http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/E-Commerce.pdf)).
27. Entrance into the terrestrial radio market has traditionally been heavily regulated by the
communications industry. See generally DiCola, supra note 20. This is not so for Internet radio.
For example, one online guide to starting your own Internet radio station claims that you can start
a “legal [I]nternet radio station for less than $40,” assuming you have a computer that is “3 years
old or newer” and a broadband Internet connection. ILikeTunes.com, Building Your Dream:
How to Start an Internet Radio Station, http://www.iliketunes.com/stationguide.asp (last visited
Feb. 8, 2008).
28. Assael, supra note 15, at 32. See CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,084–86.
29. See, e.g., Elliot Van Buskirk, Royalty Hike Panics Webcasters, WIRED MAGAZINE, Mar.
6, 2007, available at http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2007/03/72879 (last
visited Nov. 9, 2007) (“Larger services that offer thousands of channels, such as the free Pandora,
are also facing a huge spike in royalty costs.”) (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Peter Passell, Coast-to-Coast Radio Without Squawk or Fade, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1994, at F8 (explaining that “signals from [radio] transmission towers will always have
limited range.”). Similar to Internet radio, HD and satellite radio also offer a stronger and clearer
reception than traditional analog radio. See Glenn Fleishman, Revolution on the Radio, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 2005, at C11.
31. See Kidd, supra note 26, at 363 n.148 (“This lower payment schedule will ensure that
Internet radio continues to offer consumers a nearly endless number of listening choices . . .”)
(quoting Rep. Karen McCarthy, 148 Cong. Rec. 19,283 (2002)).
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traditional radio dial. Once you start listening to Internet radio, the limits of
AM and FM—a limited number of stations, within a limited geographical
area—seem like a throwback to another era. Net radio provides possibilities
for listening well beyond the advertising-soaked sameness of the commercial
32
stations available.

Internet radio’s success has not gone unnoticed. Advertisers have certainly
started to follow listeners to Internet radio. In fact, Bridge Ratings projects
that advertising revenue from Internet radio may even surpass that of
traditional radio in 2008 and will continue to increase as Internet radio attracts
more listeners.33 Moreover, the recording industry has taken notice of Internet
radio’s success. After suffering years of declining record sales, the industry
has recently put more and more pressure on Congress to strengthen federal
protection of sound recording in order to realize Internet radio’s potentially
lucrative and previously untapped revenue stream.34 Unfortunately, recent
increases in federal protection of sound recordings—particularly as reflected
by the current royalty system—threaten the very diversity that has made
Internet radio a successful alternative to terrestrial radio.35

32. HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 11, at 178 (quoting critic Allan Hoffman).
33. Bridge Ratings, HD vs. Internet Radio (Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.bridgeratings.com/
press_08.08.07.HDvs Internet.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2007). Unfortunately, increased ad
revenue alone has not proven sufficient to counterbalance or fully account for recent increases in
royalty rates. In fact, since the latest rates became effective, many webcasters have either been
forced to shut down or cut back on the number of music streams offered to the public, or even
restrict the number of listeners able to tune-in to the station at a given time. Hiawatha Bray,
Internet Radio Firms Say Royalties Limiting Choices, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2008, at C1.
If increased ad revenue sufficiently accounted for increased royalty costs, webcasters would be
adding listening streams and trying to attract more listeners rather than decreasing those amounts,
given that an advertiser’s willingness to pay is directly tied to the number of consumers its
advertising reaches.
34. See, e.g., Assael, supra note 15, at 32 (“If our artists aren’t making money from CD
sales, we think they should make money from [all Internet radio broadcasts].” (quoting John
Simson, Executive Director of SoundExchange)); All Access Music Group, Exclusive:
SoundExchange’s Simson Ties Royalty to New Artist Airplay, Nov. 19, 2007, (on file with author)
available at http://www.allaccess.com/site/features/index.php?bs=sk&sn=interviews&f=%3C
span%20class= simson&ag=172 (“What you have to recognize is that radio play can be substitute
[sic] for CD sales.” (quoting John Simson, Executive Director of SoundExchange)). Since the
recording industry is targeting Internet radio as a way to make up lost record sales, should it not
also be targeting terrestrial and satellite radio and trying to get those media outlets to pay
equivalent digital performance royalties? Is not the only significant difference between these
types of radio the medium over which content is broadcast? This Recent Development suggests
that, in fact, medium is the only relevant difference between terrestrial, Internet, and satellite
radio, and that this distinction is insufficient to justify the disparate treatment of broadcasters
concerning royalty rates.
35. Bray, supra note 33, at C5 (“Critics of the royalty system say the result [of increased
royalties] is decreasing musical diversity on the Internet . . . ‘Your Internet radio is going to
sound like your AM and FM.’”) (quoting Johnie Floater, general manager of media for Live365).
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Federal Protection of Sound Recordings

Section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976 extends federal copyright
protection to eight types of works, including “musical works” and “sound
recordings.”36 A musical work consists of the underlying notes and lyrics of a
song, while a sound recording results from the specific fixation or recording of
a song.37 Thus, one musical work may have multiple sound recordings,
depending on the number of times the work is recorded.38
Historically, federal copyright law has granted copyright owners of
musical works the exclusive right to publicly perform their works.39 The same
cannot be said for owners of sound recordings, who did not even enjoy federal
copyright protection until 1971, when Congress passed the Sound Recording
Amendment (“SRA”) in an attempt to fight the growing threat of recording
piracy.40 While the SRA granted owners of sound recordings provisional
rights to reproduce and distribute their sound recordings—rights that became
permanent under the Copyright Act of 197641—it did not grant them the public
performance right they had been lobbying for since the 1920s.42 It would be
1995 before Congress finally granted sound recording owners (part of) what
they had been asking for.
1. The DPRA
In 1995, Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act (“DPRA”).43
The DPRA extended federal copyright
protection of sound recordings by adding § 106(6) to the Copyright Act of

36. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2006).
37. See, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004); CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1,
2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
38. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.
39. The public performance right for musical compositions dates back to the year 1856.
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, § 14:3, at 14-7, § 14:4, at 14-8 (2007) (explaining
that “[t]he 1909 [Copyright] Act continued the 1856 public performance right for dramatic works
and musical compositions”).
40. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters (Bonneville Two), 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3rd Cir. 2003);
Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. Sound recordings made
prior to February 17, 1972—the effective date of the SRA—are protectable under common and/or
state law until February 15, 2047. U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Registration for Sound
Recordings, Circular 56, (2007), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.pdf.
41. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters (Bonneville One), 153 F.Supp.2d 763, 766 (E.D. Penn.
2001), aff’d, 347 F.3d 485 (3rd Cir. 2003). See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88
Stat. 1873 (1974).
42. Bonneville One, 153 F.Supp.2d at 766; PATRY, supra note 39, at §14:29 (explaining that
after 75 years of lobbying Congress granted sound recording owners a limited public performance
right).
43. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336 (1995) [hereinafter DPRA].
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1976.44 This section granted sound recording owners the limited right to
publicly perform or authorize the public performance of their sound recordings
“by means of a digital audio transmission.”45 Congress enacted the DPRA at
the behest of a recording industry just beginning to worry that advances in
digital recording might lead to fewer sales of recorded music.46 The rationale
underlying the industry’s worry was simple: If technology continued to
progress such that users could make and freely transmit “perfect” digital copies
of sound recordings, these copies would replace (or at least negatively impact)
physical sales of recorded music.47 While Congress seems to have accepted
the recording industry’s rationale, the performance right it granted to copyright
owners of sound recordings was different from the performance right enjoyed
by copyright owners of musical works. The new “digital performance right” of
§ 106(6), as it came to be known,48 had significant limitations.
One major limitation of the digital performance right was the DPRA’s
implementation (by means of amendment to the Copyright Act) of a statutory
licensing scheme for sound recordings.49 A new § 114 allowed certain
“qualified”50 services to publicly perform sound recordings without consent
from or negotiation with sound recording owners as long as proper royalties
were paid.51 Copyright owners and users could voluntarily negotiate this
royalty rate amongst themselves.52 If they failed to agree on an industry-wide
licensing rate, either party could petition the Librarian of Congress to convene
a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (“CARP”), which would then determine
reasonable rates.53
44. Id.
45. DPRA § 106(6).
46. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 & n.4 (3rd Cir. 2003) (explaining that
when the DPRA was passed “the possible role of the commercially-nascent Internet in the
transmission of music was not yet significant enough to be considered.”).
47. Paul Maloney, Copyright Law and the CRB: What Went Wrong?, RADIO AND INTERNET
NEWSLETTER, Mar. 16, 2007, http://textpattern.kurthanson.com/crb/53/copyright-law-and-thecrb-what-went-wrong. In fact, digital copies of sound recordings are not “perfect” copies; they
are “exact” copies.” Id.
48. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 380).
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1995).
50. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F.Supp.2d 763, 768 n.5 (E.D. Penn. 2001). To
qualify for a statutory license, digital audio transmitters (1) could not be “interactive;” (2) could
“not use a signal that causes the receiver to change from one program channel to another;” (3)
could “not preannounce the broadcast of particular songs;” and (4) were required, if feasible, to
“include various information about the recording being transmitted.” In other words, interactive
and subscription services still had to directly negotiate licenses from sound recording owners.
51. Id. at 767. Further, sound recording owners cannot prevent qualified users from using
their works. Id. at 767–68.
52. Id.; DPRA § 114(e)(1).
53. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 489 (3rd Cir. 2003); DPRA § 114(f)(2).
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Under the DPRA, a CARP was directed to calculate digital performance
royalty rates with the goal of achieving the following policy objectives of §
801(b)(1) of the Copyright Act:
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public; (B) To afford
the copyright owner a fair return for his creative work and the copyright user a
fair income under existing economic conditions; (C) To reflect the relative
roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product made
available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution,
technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to
the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their
communication; (D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the
54
industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.

As explained below, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”)
replaced this policy-based standard for determining digital performance
royalties with the arm’s-length willing buyer/willing seller standard.55
However, it should be noted that the § 801(b) policy-based standard was not
discarded altogether; It continues to be the standard by which the CRB sets
royalty rates for all other forms of radio subject to the § 114 statutory license
(i.e. satellite radio).56
Congress further limited the digital performance right by providing
exemptions from the new statutory licensing scheme in § 114(d)(1)(A). In
particular, it provided that non-interactive, “nonsubscription broadcast
transmission[s]” were exempt from paying digital performance royalties.57
The classic example of such a transmission is a traditional over-the-air radio
broadcast.58 Congress explained that it did “not want to impose any ‘new and
unreasonable burdens on radio and television broadcasters, which often
promote, and appear to pose no threat to, the distribution of sound
recordings.’”59 Interestingly, webcasters were initially able to take advantage
of this exemption because, at the time the law was written, Internet speeds
were still slow and webcasting technology was still in its developmental

54. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 801(b)(1)(A)–(D), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976);
see DPRA § 114(f)(2).
55. See infra Part II.C.2.
56. See In the Matter of Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription and
Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, No. 2006-1, available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/
proceedings/2006-1/sdars-final-rates-terms.pdf; Adjustment of Rates and Terms for Preexisting
Subscription and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 71 Fed. Reg. 1455 (Jan. 9, 2006).
57. DPRA, § 114(d)(1)(A)(iii).
58. Bonneville Two, 347 F.3d at 488.
59. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 14 (1995)).
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stages.60 However, this apparent oversight (and the loophole it created for
webcasters) would be addressed in 1998, the year Congress passed the DMCA.
2. The DMCA
Congress’s enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(“DMCA”) significantly amended § 114’s digital performance right.61 The
recording industry was again the impetus behind enactment of the DMCA,
much as it had been with the DPRA. The difference this time was that the
industry was really convinced that technology advancements, including those
made in Internet radio technology, were causing people to buy fewer records.62
Accordingly, the industry pushed Congress for stronger protection of sound
recordings, and Congress responded by expanding the scope of § 114’s
compulsory licensing scheme.63
In drafting the DMCA, Congress clarified the nature of webcasters’
relationship to the § 114 compulsory license by amending § 114(d)(1)(A) so as
to make non-interactive, Internet-only webcasting explicitly subject to the
statutory licensing scheme.64 In addition, Congress removed two exemptions
from § 114(d) that may have caused some confusion for Internet-only
But while Congress clarified Internet-only webcasters’
webcasters.65
relationship to the statutory licensing scheme, it failed to explain simulcasting
webcasters’ relationship to the licensing scheme with the same specificity.
After the DMCA was passed, simulcasting radio stations still argued that
digital retransmissions qualified as § 114(d)(1)(A) “nonsubscription broadcast
transmissions” since Congress had left that section untouched when drafting
the DMCA.66 Thus, in March of 2000, the Recording Industry Association of
America (“RIAA”) petitioned the Copyright Office for a rulemaking to clarify
whether these simulcasters were exempt from or subject to the statutory
licensing scheme.67 On December 11, 2000, the Register of Copyrights issued
an administrative final ruling that “AM/FM broadcast signals transmitted

60. Matt Jackson, Comment, From Broadcast to Webcast: Copyright Law and Streaming
Media, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 447, 457 (2003).
61. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
[hereinafter DMCA].
62. Bonneville Two, 347 F.3d at 489.
63. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261).
64. Id. See DMCA §§ 114(d)(2), 114(f)(2).
65. Bonneville Two, 347 F.3d at 489.
66. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F.Supp.2d 763, 765 (E.D. Penn. 2001).
67. Bonneville Two, 347 F.3d at 489–90. See RIAA, Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com
(last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (“The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) is the trade
group that represents the U.S. recording industry.” Its “members create, manufacture and/or
distribute approximately 90% of all legitimate sound recordings produced and sold in the United
States.”).
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simultaneously over a digital communications network, such as the Internet,
[were] not exempted by § 114(d)(1)(A).”68 Simulcasters challenged this ruling
on constitutional grounds, arguing that it was promulgated in excess of the
Copyright Office’s statutory authority.69 Both the district court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
Copyright Office’s ruling as constitutional.70 As a result, simulcasters joined
Internet-only webcasters under § 114’s licensing scheme.
Maybe more significant, though, was the fact that the DMCA changed the
standard by which § 114 compulsory licensing rates were determined. Under
the DPRA, Congress had directed digital performance royalty rates to be
calculated with the aim of achieving the policy objectives of § 801(b)(1) of the
Copyright Act.71 But under the DMCA, Congress discarded these policy
objectives in favor of a new standard pursuant to which royalty rates should
“most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in
the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.”72
III. THE ROYALTY RATE DETERMINATIONS
Three different adjudicatory bodies have been charged with the task of
setting copyright royalty rates. The first was the Copyright Royalty Tribunal
(“CRT”), created under the Copyright Act of 1976 as part of the legislative
branch.73 The CRT set statutory license rates for cable retransmissions,
jukeboxes, recordings, and noncommercial broadcasts of protected works.74
The CRT existed until December 17, 1993, when it was replaced by an ad hoc
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (“CARP”) system pursuant to the
Copyright Tribunal Reform Act of 1993.75 Once a CARP convened for a
particular proceeding, it had 180 days to recommend royalty rates to the
Librarian of Congress.76 The Librarian of Congress, after consulting with the

68. Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,292
(Dec. 11, 2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
69. Id. at 77,293.
70. See Bonneville Two, 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3rd Cir. 2003).
71. DPRA, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 114(f)(2), 109 Stat. 336 (1995); see Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 801(b)(1), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
72. DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 114(f)(2)(B), 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
73. Copyright Act of 1976 § 801 et seq.
74. Id. The CRT consisted of five commissioners appointed to seven-year terms by the
President with advice and consent from the Senate. Copyright Act of 1976 § 802.
75. See Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat.
2304 (1993). A CARP consisted of three members: two chosen by the Librarian of Congress on
recommendation from the Register of Copyrights, and a third chosen by the first two members to
act as chairperson. All members were chosen from lists provided by professional arbitration
associations. Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993 § 802 (1993).
76. Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993 § 802(e).
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Register of Copyrights, had sixty days to accept or reject a panel’s rate
recommendation.77 The CARP system existed until 2004, when it was
replaced by the current Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”) pursuant to the
Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act.78 The CRB consists of three
Copyright Royalty Judges who serve for six-year, staggered terms.79
In 2002, the Librarian of Congress made the first-ever determination of
webcaster digital performance royalties upon rejecting rates recommended by a
CARP.80 Five years later, in 2007, the CRB made the second-ever
determination of such royalties.81 In making these determinations, both
entities employed the same willing buyer/willing seller standard:82
In establishing rates and terms for transmissions by eligible nonsubscription
services and new subscription services, the copyright arbitration royalty panel
shall establish rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms
that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer
and a willing seller. In determining such rates and terms, the copyright
arbitration royalty panel shall base its decision on economic, competitive and
programming information presented by the parties, including—
(i) whether use of the service may substitute for or may promote the sales
of phonorecords or otherwise may interfere with or may enhance the sound
recording copyright owner’s other streams of revenue from its sound
recordings; and
(ii) the relative roles of the copyright owner and the transmitting entity in
the copyrighted work and the service made available to the public with
respect to relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital
investment, cost, and risk.
In establishing such rates and terms, the copyright arbitration royalty panel
may consider the rates and terms for comparable types of digital audio

77. Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993 § 802(f).
78. See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118
Stat. 2341 (2004).
79. Copyright Royalty Board, http://www.loc.gov/crb/background (last visited Apr. 8,
2008). Currently, James Scott Sledge, William J. Roberts, and Stanley C. Wisniewski are the
Copyright Royalty Judges, with Sledge acting as Chief Judge. They were appointed on January
11, 2006. Id.
80. See CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.
261).
81. See generally CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 380) (Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings;
Final Rule).
82. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,243–44; CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at
24,087.
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transmission services and comparable circumstances under voluntary license
83
agreements negotiated under subparagraph (A) [of § 114(f)(2)].

Both rate determinations are explained below, with emphasis on the CRB’s
2007 decision.
A.

The 2002 Rate Determination

In July of 2001, the CARP began proceedings to determine webcaster
royalty rates for two separate licensing periods, ranging from October 28, 1998
to December 31, 2002.84 During the proceedings, the CARP considered
differing rate proposals from the RIAA and individual webcasters.85 The
RIAA proposed a royalty of either $.004 per performance or 15% of a
webcaster’s gross revenue; in addition, it suggested that each webcaster pay a
minimum annual fee of $5,000 per webcasting service.86 The RIAA derived
these proposed rates from twenty-six voluntarily negotiated agreements
between itself and individual webcasters.87 Webcasters, on the other hand,
proposed rates of $.00014 per song, $.0021 per hour, or 3% of a webcaster’s
gross revenue, to be paid in addition to a minimum annual fee of $250.88
The CARP began by considering whether any of the RIAA’s twenty-six
agreements represented the price that willing buyers and sellers would have
agreed to in the hypothetical marketplace.89 It determined that one agreement,
between Yahoo! and the RIAA, was sufficiently representative.90 The other
twenty-five agreements were disregarded on the grounds that many of them
were between the RIAA and smaller webcasters, whose bargaining power was
unequal to that of the RIAA.91 Based largely on the Yahoo! agreement, the
CARP determined that Internet-only webcasters should pay $0.0014 per

83. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(1998). Compare 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(1998) and §
114(f)(2)(B)(2004) to note changes in the statutory language made after the CRB replaced the
CARP.
84. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,241.
85. Id. at 45,241–42.
86. Id. at 45,241. In addition to charging the CARP with setting royalty rates, the Copyright
Act directed the panel to set a “minimum fee for each such type of service.” § 114(f)(2)(B)(1998).
Note also that paying a “per-performance” royalty is the equivalent of paying a royalty “per song,
per listener”—meaning that the royalty is calculated by multiplying the royalty rate for
broadcasting one song by the number of listening devices receiving that broadcast at a certain
time. See id. at 45,273.
87. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,241.
88. Id. at 45,242. Compared to a “per-performance” royalty, a “per-song” royalty is paid for
a single transmission regardless of how many people hear it at the time. See id. at 45,273.
89. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,244–45.
90. Id. at 45,245.
91. Jeremy Delibero, Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels and the Webcasting
Controversy: The Antithesis of Good Alternative Dispute Resolution, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
83, 95–96 (2005).
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performance, that simulcasters should pay $0.0007 per performance, and that
each webcasting service should pay an additional minimum annual fee of
$500.92 The CARP recommended these rates to the Librarian of Congress in
February of 2002.93
Upon recommendation from the Register of Copyrights, the Librarian of
Congress rejected the CARP’s suggested rates because they did not reflect the
true rates that willing buyers and sellers would have agreed to in the
marketplace.94 Accordingly, the Librarian reduced the proposed rate for
Internet-only webcasters from $0.0014 to $0.0007 in order to achieve parity
with the simulcasting rate.95 However, the Librarian upheld the $500
minimum annual fee as reasonable in light of administrative licensing costs.96
The main reason the Librarian of Congress reduced the Internet-only
webcasting rate was a lack of evidence in the record showing that Internet-only
webcasting was of less promotional value to copyright owners than was
simulcasting.97 Apparently, the CARP assumed this fact when it decided that
Internet-only webcasters should pay higher rates than simulcasters.98 After
reducing the Internet-only rate, the Librarian of Congress issued his final
determination of rates on July 8, 2002.99 These rates would be short-lived,
though, given that the licensing period was scheduled to expire on December
31 of that same year.100
Fortunately, the Librarian of Congress was aware of this fact.101 In
January of 2002, before rates for the 1998 to 2002 licensing period were

92. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE COPYRIGHT ARBITRATION ROYALTY PANEL,
APP. A, SUMMARY OF ROYALTY RATES FOR § 114(f)(2) and § 112(e) STATUTORY LICENSES A-1
(2002), http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates_a.pdf. See also U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, SUMMARY OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS ON RATES AND
TERMS FOR WEBCASTING AND EPHEMERAL RECORDINGS, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/
webcasting_rates_final.html (2003).
93. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,241.
94. Id. at 45,243. Marybeth Peters was the Register of Copyrights at this time; James H.
Billington was the Librarian of Congress. Id. at 45,276.
95. Id. at 45,272. The Librarian of Congress reviewed the CARP’s recommendation under
an arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. at 45,242–43.
96. Id. at 45,272. See also 37 C.F.R. 261.3(e) (2007).
97. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,252 (“The fundamental flaw in the Panel’s
analysis . . . is the Panel’s determination that the differential rate structure reflects a true
distinction in value between Internet-only transmissions and radio retransmissions based upon the
promotional value to the record companies and performers due to airplay of their music by local
radio stations.”).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 45,240.
100. Id. at 45,241.
101. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 69 Fed.
Reg. 5,693, 5,694 (Feb. 6, 2004) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 262–63) [hereinafter 2003
Determination].
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recommended by the CARP, the Librarian had initiated proceedings to set rates
for the upcoming 2003 to 2004 licensing period.102 Even with this head start,
however, the Librarian would not issue his final ruling on rates for the 2003 to
2004 period until February 6, 2004.103 Interestingly, these rates would largely
be influenced by webcasters’ reaction to the Librarian’s 2002 rates.104
Neither the RIAA nor webcasters were pleased with the Librarian’s 2002
determination of rates under the willing buyer/willing seller standard.
Webcasters in particular responded with vocal opposition, claiming that the
rates were excessive to the point they would likely drive webcasters of all sizes
out of business.105 The controversy prompted litigation, appeals, and proposed
legislation as webcasters explored a variety of means for obtaining relief from
the rates. For instance, those that partook in the CARP proceedings appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.106
Smaller webcasters, many of whom did not partake in the CARP proceedings
because of the excessive costs required to do so,107 pursued other options.
Most notably, small webcasters petitioned Congress for legislative relief. As a
result, small webcasters gained support for their cause under the guise of a
proposed bill, entitled the Internet Radio Fairness Act (“IRFA”), which
managed to pinpoint a serious problem with the royalty rate system.108
Significantly, the IRFA would have eliminated the willing buyer/willing seller
as the guidepost for future determinations of digital performance royalties.109

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 5,693.
See id. at 5,693–95.
See, e.g., Paul Maloney, Today is the Day of Silence, RADIO AND INTERNET
NEWSLETTER, May 1, 2002, http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/050102/index.shtml
(“Decrying a government-proposed royalty rate on musical recordings that they say would make
operating their businesses impossible, hundreds of webcasters and broadcasters—totaling literally
thousands of streams—are suspending their normal programming today.”). Many webcasters
actually ceased webcasting because of the 2002 rates. See, e.g., Jefferson Graham, Royalty Fees
Killing Most Internet Radio Stations, USA TODAY, July 22, 2002, at D1 (“More than 200
Internet-based radio stations have shut down because of a royalty fee that takes effect in
September, and more are closing daily.”).
106. See Stuart A. Maxey, Note, That CARP is No Keeper: Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panels—Change is Needed, Here is Why, and How, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 385, 395 (2003).
107. Id. at 395–96 (discussing the costs of CARP proceedings). See also Copyright
Arbitration Panel (CARP) Structure and Process: Hearing before the House Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop., 107th Cong. 3 (2002), available at
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/www.judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/80194.pdf (Rep.
Howard L. Berman explains the often great expense of participating in a CARP proceeding).
108. See H.R. 5285, 107th Cong. (2002) (introduced by Rep. Jay Inslee, D-WA, on July 26,
2002), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_bills&
docid=f:h5285ih.txt.pdf.
109. Id. (“Section 114(f)(2)(B) of [17 U.S.C.] is amended—(1) by striking ‘Such rates and
terms shall distinguish’ and all that follows through ‘capital investment, cost, and risk.’; and (2)
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But, the IRFA never became law.110 Instead, an untimely failure in
negotiations between the RIAA and webcasters led Congress to pass the Small
Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002 (“SWSA”), which effectively negated any
immediate need for the IRFA.111
The SWSA empowered SoundExchange,112 then the royalty collection arm
of the RIAA, to directly negotiate royalty rates with small commercial and
noncommercial webcasters.113 It also provided the parties with an additional
six to twelve months in which to negotiate lower rates.114 Under the SWSA,
any agreement reached between SoundExchange and webcasters would be
published in the Federal Register.115 Further, qualified webcasters could opt-in
to those agreements instead of paying the Librarian of Congress’s default
rates.116
After President Bush signed the SWSA into law on December 4, 2002,
SoundExchange and a group of small commercial webcasters negotiated a
settlement agreement that allowed “small” webcasters to retroactively pay the
greater of 8% of their revenue or 5% of their expenses for the period of 1998 to
2002.117 For 2003 and 2004, small webcasters could pay the greater of 7% of

by inserting after ‘as the parties may agree.’ the following: ‘The copyright arbitration royalty
panel shall establish rates and terms in accordance with the objectives set forth in section
801(b)(1).’”).
110. See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS FOR THE 107TH
CONGRESS: H.R. 5285, http://thomas.loc.gov/.
111. See Small Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780
(2002) (hereinafter SWSA), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/pl107-321.pdf.
The SWSA resulted from The Helms Amendment to the Small Webcaster Amendments Act of
2002, H.R. 5469, 107th Cong. (2002) (emphasis added). See Kidd, supra note 26, at 355–360.
112. See SoundExchange, http://soundexchange.com (“SoundExchange is an independent,
nonprofit performance rights organization that is designated by the U.S. Copyright Office to
collect and distribute digital performance royalties for featured recording artists and sound
recording copyright owners . . . SoundExchange currently represents over 3,500 record labels and
over 31,000 featured artists.”) (last visited Ap. 13, 2008). CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg.
24,084, 24,102 & n.59 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380) (explaining that
SoundExchange once was an unincorporated division of the RIAA, but is now an independent
entity).
113. Kidd, supra note 26, at 358–59 (“Noncommercial stations were given until June 20,
2003 and small commercial webcasters until December 15, 2003 to negotiate royalty rates [with
SoundExchange].”).
114. Id. at 359.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 361–62.
117. See Notification of Agreement under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 67
Fed. Reg. 78,510, 78,510–11 (Dec. 24, 2002) (not codified in 37 C.F.R. pt. 261) [hereinafter First
Agreement]. To qualify as an “eligible small webcaster” under this agreement, a webcaster’s
gross revenue could not exceed $1 million to $1.25 million from 1998 to 2004. Id. at 78,513,
App. A (appendix not codified).
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their expenses or 10% of their first $250,000 in revenue, plus 12% of any
revenue above that amount.118
On May 20, 2003, a second SWSA settlement set alternate rates for all
nonsubscription webcasting services (including large and small commercial
webcasters) for 2003 and 2004.119 Significantly, this broader agreement gave
nonsubscription services the option to choose between per-performance and
The perper-aggregate-tuning-hour (“ATH”) payment schemes.120
performance rate was set at $0.000762; the per-ATH option ranged from
$0.000762 to $0.0117, depending on the type of programming involved.121
Finally, a third SWSA agreement between SoundExchange and
noncommercial webcasters was published on June 11, 2003, with similar terms
to the May 20th agreement.122 Under these three agreements, SoundExchange
essentially agreed to industry-wide rates that were lower and offered more
payment options than the Librarian of Congress’s default rates.123 Webcasters
who had opted-in to any prior SWSA settlement agreement could notify
SoundExchange in writing if they wanted to opt-in to any later SWSA
agreement.124 Because the industry-wide SWSA settlement agreements
extended through 2004, the Librarian of Congress did not need to convene a
CARP to determine the default 2003 and 2004 licensing rates.125 The
Librarian merely adopted the negotiated rates, and webcasters ended up paying
these rates through 2005 and 2006.126
Overall, while the SWSA provided webcasters with some short-term relief
from the CARP’s 2002 rate determination, it ultimately failed to address the
118. Id. at 75,111.
119. See Digital Performance Right in Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 68 Fed. Reg.
27,506, 27,506–07 (May, 20, 2003) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 262) [hereinafter Second
Agreement]. Note that this agreement actually superseded and amended a May 1, 2003
settlement agreement. Id. at 27,506. See 68 Fed. Reg. 23,241, 23,241–43 (May 1, 2003).
120. Second Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 27,508–09. An aggregate tuning hour (“ATH”) is a
method of calculating the total number of hours of programming transmitted by webcasters to
listeners across the country. Thus, one ATH is the equivalent of one listener listening for one
hour, or two listeners listening for half an hour each, and so on. See, e.g., CRB Determination, 72
Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,110 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380) (defining Aggregate
Tuning Hours).
121. Second Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 27,508–09.
122. Notification of Agreement under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. 35,008, 35,008–12 (June 11, 2003) [hereinafter Third Agreement]. See also Second
Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 27,510.
123. See Third Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 35,009–11. See also Second Agreement, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 27,510.
124. Third Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 35,009–10.
125. Second Agreement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 27,506.
126. Id. However webcasters would only get the benefit of these rates for 2005 since the
CRB’s 2007 rate determination applied retroactively to 2006. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg.
24,084, 24,084 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
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underlying problem pinpointed by the IRFA, namely, the flawed standard by
which webcaster royalty rates are determined under the Copyright Act. Thus,
the willing buyer/willing seller standard survived to see a second rate
determination.
B.

The 2007 Rate Determination

After replacing the CARP system in 2004, the CRB received its first case
in early 2005 when it was petitioned to set new webcaster royalty rates for the
licensing period of January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2010.127 After an initial
discovery period and the filing of written statements, twenty-three parties
remained to make their cases before the CRB.128 Litigation consumed half of
2005 and all of 2006.129 The CRB made its initial determination of rates and
terms on March 2, 2007, three months after hearing closing arguments.130 The
CRB’s decision was met by motions for rehearing filed by nearly all parties.131
All such motions, however, were subsequently denied because none of them
demonstrated that the CRB’s initial determination was unsupported by the
evidence, was erroneous, was contrary to legal requirements, or justified the
introduction of new evidence.132 The CRB issued its final ruling on May 1,
2007.133
In that ruling, the CRB began by laying out the willing buyer/willing seller
standard pursuant to which the Copyright Royalty Judges (“Judges”) would
attempt to determine the prices that webcasters and record companies would

127. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,084–86.
128. Id. (“The parties to this proceeding are: (i) Digital Media Association and certain of its
member companies that participated in this proceeding, namely: America Online, Inc. (“AOL”),
Yahoo!, Inc. (“Yahoo!”), Microsoft, Inc. (“Microsoft”), and Live365, Inc. (“Live365”)
(collectively referred to as “DiMA”); (ii) “Radio Broadcasters” (this designation was adopted by
the parties): namely, Bonneville International Corp., Clear Channel Communications, Inc.,
National Religious Broadcasters Music License Committee (“NRBMLC”), Susquehanna Radio
Corp.; (iii) SBR Creative Media, Inc. (“SBR”) and the “Small Commercial Webcasters” (this
designation was adopted by the parties): namely, AccuRadio, LLC, Digitally Imported, Inc.,
Radioio.com LLC, Discombobulated, LLC, 3WK, LLC, Radio Paradise, Inc.; (iv) National
Public Radio, Inc. (“NPR”), Corporation for Public Broadcasting-Qualified Stations (“CPB”),
National Religious Broadcasters Noncommercial Music License Committee (“NRBNMLC”),
Collegiate Broadcasters, Inc. (“CBI”), Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc., (“IBS”), and
Harvard Radio Broadcasting, Inc. (“WHRB”); (v) Royalty Logic, Inc. (“RLI”); and (vi)
SoundExchange, Inc. (“SoundExchange”).”).
129. Id. at 24,084–85.
130. Id. at 24,085.
131. Id. at 24,085 & n.2 (“Motions were filed by DiMA, IBS, WHRB, NPR, Radio
Broadcasters, RLI, Small Commercial Webcasters, SoundExchange and CBI.”). See supra note
128 for party abbreviations.
132. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,085–86.
133. Id. at 24,084.
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have agreed to in a hypothetical market not restricted by a statutory license.
The Judges granted that this hypothetical marketplace would invariably consist
of “significant variations, among both buyers and sellers, in terms of
sophistication, economic resources, business exigencies, and myriad other
factors.”134 However, they determined that Congress would have been aware
of these variations when it created the standard. Thus, they concluded that the
language of the statute demonstrated Congress’s intent that the Judges make
their determination of webcaster royalty rates “absent [these] special
circumstances.”135
The CRB’s application of willing buyer/willing seller standard can be
broken into two parts. The first addressed the most appropriate rate structure
for webcasters; the second attempted to determine the exact rates that the
parties would have agreed to in the hypothetical marketplace.
1. Appropriate Rate Structures
The CRB’s first task was to determine the most appropriate type of rate
structure for commercial and noncommercial webcasters, respectively.136 The
CRB distinguished noncommercial and commercial webcasters on the basis
that they “represent different segments of the marketplace.”137 The Judges
considered various proposals from SoundExchange and from webcasters in
making its decision.138 Commercial webcasters proposed a rate structure under
which webcasters could elect to pay under per-performance, per-ATH, or
SoundExchange proposed alternative
percentage-of-revenue metrics.139
payment metrics for commercial webcasters, consisting of per-performance
and percentage-of-gross-revenue options.140 After considering the parties’
proposals and expert witness testimony, the CRB decided that the appropriate
rate structure for commercial webcasters was solely a per-performance usage
rate.141
When small commercial webcasters objected that a percentage-of-revenue
structure was necessary for the “nascent” Internet radio industry, or at least
required for small entrepreneurs to grow their businesses, the Judges’ response
was that small webcasters were not really as concerned with the structure of
the rate as they were with the amount of the rate, the latter of which would
134. Id. at 24,087.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 24,088. A “commercial webcaster” is a webcaster and § 114 compulsory licensee,
and is neither a nonprofit nor a government-owned organization. See id. at 24,111 (defining
commercial and noncommercial webcasters).
137. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,091.
138. Id. at 24,088.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

446

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII:427

ultimately determine the financial viability of webcasters’ businesses.142 The
Judges emphasized that it was not their job to “guarantee a profitable business
to every market entrant” and commented that treating small webcasters
differently from other webcasters would involve “making a policy decision
rather than applying the willing buyer/willing seller standard of the Copyright
Act.”143 Moreover, the Judges explained that they preferred a metric based on
performances because it was “directly tied to the nature of the right being
licensed,” whereas “revenue merely serves as ‘a proxy’ for . . .
‘performances.’”144 Further, the Judges thought a revenue-based system would
lead to auditing and enforcement problems and an overall increase in
transaction costs.145 For these reasons, the Judges decided that a perperformance metric alone was the most appropriate payment structure for
commercial webcasters.
The CRB next turned its attention to noncommercial webcasters.
Noncommercial webcasters had proposed a variety of distinct rate structures,
most of which revolved around annual per-station flat fees.146 For example,
NPR proposed an annual $80,000 flat fee that would cover all of its stations
and would adjust annually for the cost of living.147 SoundExchange, which
believed that noncommercial and commercial webcasters should be treated
alike, proposed the same per-performance and revenue-based structures that it
had for commercial webcasters.148 After considering the proposals and expert
testimony, the CBR determined that the appropriate rate structure for
noncommercial webcasters was “an annual flat per-station rate structure . . . up
to a specified cap coupled with a per-performance rate for use by
noncommercial services that exceed the cap.”149
The CRB gave several reasons for its decision. Because noncommercial
rates had traditionally been structured as flat-fee arrangements, the Judges
decided to maintain this distinction from commercial webcasters.150 Further,
the Judges were worried that the line between noncommercial and commercial
webcasters was starting to blur. The Judges decided to further preserve the
distinction between the types of webcasters by placing a cap on the amount of

142. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,089 (quoting Kurt Hanson, CEO/President of
AccuRadio, LLC) (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 24,088 n.8.
144. Id. at 24,089 (quoting Dr. Adam B. Jaffe, Brandeis University, professor in economics).
145. Id. at 24,089–90.
146. Id. at 24,090.
147. Id. (explaining that NPR has roughly 798 stations). Other proposed flat fees proposed by
noncommercial webcasters ranged from a twenty-five dollar annual rate for smaller collegiate
educational stations to $500 per year for noncommercial music stations. See, id. at 24,090–91.
148. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,090.
149. Id. at 24,091.
150. Id.
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hours a noncommercial station could broadcast under the flat fee.151 If a
noncommercial webcaster exceeded the hourly cap, it would have to pay
royalties at commercial per-performance rates.152
In sum, the CRB concluded in the first part of its analysis that commercial
webcasters should pay according to a per-performance rate and that
noncommercial webcasters should pay an annual flat per-station rate, capped
and coupled with a per-performance rate for any use in excess of the cap.
2. Royalty Rates in the Hypothetical Market
The second part of the CRB’s analysis attempts to determine the royalty
rates that would have been negotiated by willing buyers and sellers in a
hypothetical marketplace not constrained by a statutory license.153 Both
SoundExchange and webcasters agreed that the best way to determine such
rates would be to use comparable marketplace agreements as “benchmarks” for
guidance.154 However, the parties disagreed on how to define the hypothetical
seller’s marketplace: SoundExchange blamed webcasters for falsely
characterizing the marketplace as perfectly competitive; webcasters claimed
that SoundExchange viewed the marketplace as a monopoly in favor of the
seller.155
In settling the dispute, the CRB referred to the CARP’s 2002 analysis of
the relevant marketplace.156 The CARP had determined that the target market
should be a “competitive” market—not a monopoly or a perfectly competitive
market—in which record companies were the appropriate hypothetical
seller.157 The Judges adopted this definition of the pertinent target market;
further, they chose to incorporate the two statutory factors of the willing
buyer/willing seller test into their search for the most appropriate benchmark in
the target market.158
The CRB accepted proposals from the parties on what they thought the
appropriate benchmarks would be, again treating commercial and
noncommercial webcasters separately.159 Commercial webcasters suggested
that the most appropriate benchmarks were agreements between webcasters
and performing rights organizations concerning licenses to publicly perform
musical works.160 However, the CRB sided with SoundExchange and found
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,091.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24,091–92.
CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,092.
Id.
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that the most suitable benchmarks were royalty agreements between record
companies and large interactive webcasting services regarding sound recording
licenses.161 In accepting SoundExchange’s proposal, the Judges reasoned that
the interactive and non-interactive webcasting markets were reasonably
similar, especially after adjustments were made to account for the ability of
interactive-webcasting listeners to influence the programming they hear.162
Further, the Judges rejected commercial webcasters’ musical works benchmark
because, while the buyers in both markets were the same, the sellers and the
rights being sold in the two markets were different.163 In other words, the CRB
rejected commercial webcasters’ benchmark because (1) those who typically
sold public performance rights (i.e., performing rights organizations) differed
from those who typically sold sound recording rights (i.e., record labels), and
(2) public performance rights and sound recording rights were not sufficiently
similar according to empirical evidence presented by SoundExchange, which
showed that buyers paid much more for sound recording rights (e.g., in ring
tones, digital downloads, music videos, etc.) than they did for public
performance rights in musical works.164
After deciding to use SoundExchange’s interactive webcasting benchmark,
the CRB further decided to adopt the exact per-performance rates proposed by
SoundExchange.165 Thus, the CRB ruled that commercial webcasters have to
pay the following royalties per song, per listener from 2006 to 2010: $0.0008
for 2006, $0.0011 for 2007, $0.0014 for 2008, $0.0018 for 2009, and $0.0019
for 2010.166 In addition to adopting SoundExchange’s rate structure, the CRB
also adopted SoundExchange’s proposed minimum annual fee of $500 per
channel or station.167 The Judges explained that the relevant purpose of the
minimum fee was to prevent situations where it would cost the license
administrator more to administer the license than the license administrator
would receive in performance royalties from the licensee.168
The CRB next set out to determine the appropriate benchmark for
noncommercial webcasters.169 Following the same analysis, the CRB first
analyzed the parties’ proposals.170 SoundExchange again proposed the same
interactive webcasting benchmark that it had proposed for commercial

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 24,094.
Id.
CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,095.
Id. at 24,096.
Id. at 24,096–97.
Id. at 24,096.
Id. at 24,097.
Id.
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webcasters.171 Noncommercial webcasters argued that they were sufficiently
different from commercial webcasters to warrant a unique benchmark.172
Accordingly, they proposed two alternatives: one benchmark based on the rates
that terrestrial radio stations pay to broadcast musical works over-the-air, and a
second benchmark based on the rates found in a 1998-2004 agreement between
NPR and SoundExchange concerning the streaming of sound recordings.173
After considering the proposals, the CRB determined that neither party’s
benchmarks adequately approximated the fee that noncommercial webcasters
would have negotiated with record companies.174 However, after determining
that the administrative costs incurred by record companies in licensing rights to
both noncommercial and commercial webcasters were the same, the CRB
decided that these administrative costs would best serve as its benchmark.175
Thus, the CRB concluded that the appropriate flat fee would be an annual $500
minimum per-channel or station flat fee for all noncommercial webcasters.176
Furthermore, the CRB’s new rate structure required an ATH cap above
which noncommercial webcasters would pay commercial per-performance
rates.177 Recall that the purpose of the cap was to maintain the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial stations.178 SoundExchange argued
for a cap at 14,600 ATH based on expert testimony suggesting that the typical
noncommercial station averaged twenty simultaneous listeners at any given
time.179 But the CRB found that cap too limiting, especially after considering
the terms of a 2001 agreement between NPR and SoundExchange, in which
NPR negotiated substantially lower rates than commercial stations.180 This
evidence convinced the Judges that, because NPR was sufficiently distinct
from commercial webcasters in SoundExchange’s eyes, NPR’s average ATH
rates would be a good place at which to establish its ATH cap.181 After
consulting a 2004 survey regarding typical NPR streaming practices, the
Judges found that NPR stations averaged 159,140 ATH per month (or 218
simultaneous listeners per station).182 This was the ATH cap the CRB used.183

171. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,097.
172. Id. at 24,097.
173. Id. at 24,098.
174. Id. at 24,099.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg at 24,099.
178. Id. at 24,091.
179. Id. at 24,099.
180. Id. (“Based on the available evidence, the typical NPR station . . . would not have been
treated as the functional equivalent of a commercial station.”).
181. Id. at 24,100.
182. Id. at 24,099.
183. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,100.
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The CRB’s final ruling came down on May 1, 2007.184 In its ruling, the
CRB created a two year transition period (2006 and 2007) in which
commercial webcasters could use ATH under previous rates to estimate usage
and royalties.185 The CRB’s final rates look like this:
Commercial Rates
Year
2006*
2007*
2008
2009
2010

Fee Per
Performance
$0.0008
$0.0011
$0.0014
$0.0018
$0.0019

Noncommercial Rates
Year
2006 to
2010

Flat Rate Plus
Commercial Rates
$500 per station or
per channel up to
159,140 ATH per
month, plus
commercial rates in
excess of cap.

3. Reactions to the 2007 Rates
Webcasters of all sizes have decried the CRB’s new rates, which boast
fewer payment options and significantly higher fees than the previous term.
According to the SaveNetRadio Coalition,186 the latest royalties represent a
300 percent to 1,200 percent increase over the royalties paid in the previous
term.187 Joe Kennedy, CEO of the relatively large webcaster Pandora, admits
that he is “not aware of any Internet radio service that believes it can sustain a

184. Id. at 24,084.
185. Id. at 24,100 n.55 (“The Judges recognize that a smooth transition from the prior fee
regime to the new fee structure adopted by the Judges hereinabove may be aided by permitting
the limited use of an ATH calculation option.”) The ATH rates of the prior regime ranged from
$0.0008 to $0.0169, depending on the type of programming (e.g. non-music, simulcasting, or
other programming). Id. at 24,096.
186. SaveNetRadio
Coalition,
http://www.savenetradio.org/about/index.html
(“The
SaveNetRadio Coalition is made up of artists, labels, listeners, and webcasters” with the common
goal of creating “an environment where Internet radio, and the millions of artists it features, can
continue to grow for generations to come.”). John Draper, a hobbyist webcaster, purchased the
domain name SaveNetRadio.org and “offered it to colleagues as a rallying point to fight back
against the CRB’s increased rates. Assael, supra note 15, at 32 (explaining that Draper’s monthly
royalty payments increased from $120 to $6500 under the latest rate increase).
187. Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, SaveNetRadio Coalition Joins the Fight to
Preserve the Future of Internet Radio (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.savenetradio.org/press_room/
press_releases/070416-savenetradio.pdf. But see All Access Music Group, supra note 34,
In 2006, the rate was raised [five percent] over the existing rate in 2005, but the rate had
been flat for the seven years prior to that. We figure the increase to [thirty-five percent] in
2007, but that [i]s not much when you put that in context to the rate almost [ten] years
ago.
(quoting John Simson, Executive Director of SoundExchange).
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business” under what he calls the “disastrous” new rates.188 Bill Goldsmith of
Radio Paradise, a smaller webcaster, agrees: “This royalty structure would
wipe out an entire class of business,” namely, “small independent webcasters
such as myself [sic] and my wife.”189 Moreover, it has been reported that even
large commercial webcasters like Yahoo! and AOL are considering shutting
down their Internet radio operations altogether due to a reported thirty-eight
percent increase in royalties.190
As in 2002, webcasters have been actively seeking judicial and legislative
relief from the royalty rates produced through application of the willing
buyer/willing seller standard. Their hope is to secure a “reasonable, long term
solution” to the controversy that is not “subject to increase at the whim of the
recording industry every five years” and that achieves “royalty parity” with
other forms of radio (e.g. satellite and terrestrial radio).191
On the other side of the controversy, the recording industry and
SoundExchange have “applaud[ed] the higher worth” placed on sound
recordings by the CRB.192 SoundExchange in particular has been quick to
dismiss webcasters’ worries, predicting that the overall business of webcasting
will continue to thrive despite the increase in rates.193 It maintains that the
willing buyer/willing seller standard produces “fair and reasonable” rates and
has called for webcasters to be “forthcoming” about the integrity of the current
rate-determination process, categorizing webcasters’ complaints of unfairness
as “not really about the process, but rather about the results.”194 Likewise,
SoundExchange believes that webcasters have failed to appreciate the full
188. Van Buskirk, supra note 29; see also Pandora, http://www.pandora.com.
189. Van Buskirk, supra note 29; see also Radio Paradise, http://www.radioparadise.com.
190. Meg Tirrell, Yahoo, AOL May Abandon Web Radio After Royalties Rise, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&refer=us&sid=
a0pKOrcpw6yE.
191. Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, Small Webcasters Reject SoundExchange
License (Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.savenetradio.org/press_room/press_releases/070919reject.pdf; Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, Cable Radio Royalties Align with Internet
Radio Legislation (Nov. 5, 2007), http://www.savenetradio.org/press_room/press_releases/
071105-cable_music_agreement.pdf. Many webcasters also believe that terrestrial radio should
be subject to the same royalty payments to which Internet and satellite radio are subject. See infra
Part IV.2 for more discussion about this issue.
192. Dale Buss, Internet Radio in the Balance, 5 INTELL. PROP. L. & BUS. 14, 14 (2007).
193. Id.
194. Press Release, SoundExchange, Statement by SoundExchange Regarding the Copyright
Royalty Board’s Decision Setting Webcasting Royalty Rates for 2006-2010 (Mar. 9, 2007),
http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “News” hyperlink, then follow “SX News” hyperlink)
(“The Copyright Royalty Board has issued a fair and reasonable decision . . . . ”); see also
SoundExchange, SoundExchange Calls on Webcasters to Recognize Value of Music Performers
to Web Business (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “News” hyperlink,
then follow “SX News” hyperlink)(quoting John Simpson, Executive Director of Sound
Exchange).
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value that recording artists provide to the webcasting industry and that the
CRB’s rates properly reflect this value.195 The CEO of SoundExchange has
even suggested that higher royalty rates may actually be a valuable means for
getting new and emerging artists radio airplay.196 Overall, the recording
industry does not believe that webcasters should be able to digitally perform
sound recordings without fully compensating artists for creating the music,
even if that means webcasters cannot maintain financially viable businesses.197
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE RATE-DETERMINATION PROCESS
As demonstrated by Part III above, each rate determination under the
willing buyer/willing seller standard has generated significant conflict between
the webcasting and recording industries. Critics have generally characterized
the underlying cause of the controversy as some fundamental flaw in the ratedetermination process.198 Likewise, Congress has noticed and even attempted
to repair flaws in the determination process, most recently following the
Librarian of Congress’s 2002 decision.199 However, after enacting the SWSA
and replacing the CARP system with the CRB, Congress found itself
confronted by a webcasting community seeking legislative and judicial relief
for the second time in five years. Apparently, Congress failed to address the
relevant flaw in the determination process the first time around. If that flaw
manages to survive subsequent rate determinations, the webcasting and
recording industries will likely find themselves in a cyclical struggle over

195. Id. (“The music created by artists is the main reason why people listen to [I]nternet
radio, and those artists should be fairly compensated for the value they bring to each webcaster’s
business . . . . ”); see also Press Release, SoundExchange, Statements by SoundExchange
Regarding the Copyright Royalty Board’s Decision Setting Webcasting Royalty Rates for 20062010, supra note 194 (“Artists have earned the right to be fairly compensated for the performance
of their work by webcasters who benefit—financially or otherwise—from their talents. . . . [I]t is
our strong desire to see a thriving online radio marketplace . . . However, such a marketplace
cannot be sustained without music, and the decision of the CRB fully recognizes and reflects this
fact.”).
196. All Access Music Group, supra note 34 (Perhaps what will happen is that this will get
radio more engaged in playing newer and emerging artists more often, instead of giving the
majority [o]f airplay to established superstars. Record companies and new artists would be more
likely to make a deal, something like ‘We [woul]d love you to play this record, so we [wi]ll give
you a break on performance rates for the first [ninety] days [the record’s] out.
(quoting John Simson, Executive Director of Sound Exchange)).
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Kidd, supra note 26, at 369 (“To avoid placing webcasters, small or large, in a
royalty fight similar to the one that arose in 2002, Congress should reform the CARP process.”);
see also CASTRO, supra note 20, at 1 (“Congress needs to enact legislation to reform the current
system.”).
199. See, e.g., the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118
Stat. 2341 (2004); see also SWSA, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (2002).
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royalty rates that will prevent both industries and the public from realizing the
full potential of Internet radio.
Criticism of the current determination process runs both narrow and broad
in scope. The narrow line of criticism takes critical aim at the willing
buyer/willing seller standard—particularly at its overall suitability for and
effectiveness in determining Internet radio royalty rates.200 The broader line of
criticism addresses concerns that the current rate-determination process
discriminates against Internet radio on the basis of technology.201
1. A Flawed Standard
Several commentators have pinpointed the willing buyer/willing seller
standard as one of the key flaws of the current determination process.202 In
fact, it appears to be the very root of the royalty controversy. Perhaps the
simplest criticism of the willing buyer/willing seller standard is that it has
twice proven ineffective at producing credibly fair royalty rates for the type of
rights at issue in Internet webcasting. The fact that it has produced extremely
controversial royalty rates in the only two instances it has ever been applied
provides reasonable support for this criticism. Moreover, Congress arguably
did not intend to induce a cyclical clash between the recording and webcasting
industries when it adopted the willing buyer/willing seller standard in 1998.
Further, there is no evidence indicating that Congress intended application of
the standard to strengthen the digital performance right at the ultimate expense
of small and noncommercial webcasters. On the contrary, following the
Librarian of Congress’s 2002 rate determination, Congress displayed a
different intent when it rescued small commercial and noncommercial
webcasters from apparently oppressive rates by enacting the Small Webcaster
Settlement Act of 2002.203 In doing so—whether explicitly or not—Congress
recognized for important policy reasons that it is in the “public interest” to
protect these webcasters from being driven out of business.204
Arguably then, the willing buyer/willing seller standard’s ineffectiveness
stems from the fact that it has been interpreted as prohibiting the rate-setter
from making similar public policy decisions in determining reasonable rates.205

200. Karen Fessler, Webcasting Royalty Rates, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 399, 411 (2003).
201. CASTRO, supra note 20, at 1.
202. See Fessler, supra note 200, at 411; see also Kidd, supra note 26, at 372; Jackson, supra
note 60, at 476; Delibero, supra note 91, at 111–12.
203. See SWSA, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (2002).
204. Id. (“It is, nevertheless, in the public interest for the parties to be able to enter into such
an agreement without fear of liability for deviating from the fees and terms of the July 8 [2002]
order . . . .”).
205. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,254 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 261) (“Where the intent of Congress is to set a rate at fair market value, as in this proceeding,
the Panel is not required to consider potential failure of those businesses that cannot compete in
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If this interpretation of the statute is accurate, it would be contradictory and
hypocritical for Congress to continue to direct the CRB to make policy-barren
royalty determinations only to undercut the effect of those determinations at a
later date with policy-based legislation (like the SWSA). To avoid this result,
it is imperative that Congress realize that public policy considerations should
play an important role in the determination of webcaster royalty rates,
particularly since the ultimate goal of copyright law in American jurisprudence
is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the public good.”206 The willing
buyer/willing seller standard—in its one-sided, fair market approach—has
failed to stimulate artistic creativity for the public good. Instead, it has twice
produced royalty rates that threaten to drive webcasters—particularly those
supplying the diversity that makes Internet radio such an appealing alternative
to today’s homogeneous AM/FM stations—out of business. The standard is
flawed in this respect and needs to be replaced by a one that consistently
encourages artistic creativity for the public good.
Other criticisms of the willing buyer/willing seller standard focus more on
perceived flaws in how the standard has been applied in the rate-determination
process. One such criticism is that application of the standard consistently
produces a “one-size-fits-all” royalty rate that affects all webcasters—from
basement hobbyists to multimillion-dollar corporations—without accounting
for noticeable differences between types of webcasters.207 A close reading of §
114(f)(2)(B) reveals that these “one-size-fits-all” rates are best explained as the
product of statutory interpretation rather than clear statutory mandate.208 The

the marketplace. . . . The law . . . is silent on what effect the rates should have on particular
individual services who wish to operate under the license.”)
See also CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,088 n.8 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 380) (“It must be emphasized that, in reaching a determination, the Copyright Royalty
Judges cannot guarantee a profitable business to every market entrant. Indeed, the normal free
market processes typically weed out those entities that have poor business models or are
inefficient. . . . Furthermore, it would involve the Copyright Royalty Judges in making a policy
decision rather than applying the willing buyer/willing seller standard of the Copyright Act.”).
206. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”)
(emphasis added); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985) (“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”)(emphasis added). These quotations
represent the “utilitarian” justification for copyright law, which is currently the dominant
justification in American jurisprudence. CRAIG JOYCE ET. AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 52 n.2
(LexisNexis 7th ed.) (2007).
207. Fessler, supra note 200, at 417. While the CRB did, of course, make the minimal
distinction between commercial and noncommercial webcasters, it refused to go any further. See
CRB Determinations, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,089 n.9.
208. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2004) states,
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text directs the rate-setting body to set rates that “distinguish among the
different types of eligible . . . services.”209 Moreover, it gives the rate-setters
the uninhibited freedom to consider any criteria in making such distinctions.210
One might expect a straightforward application of this language to produce
multiple royalty rates based on the seemingly numerous grounds on which to
distinguish webcasters,211 especially given that the CARP and the CRB have
conceded that the webcasting market is composed of diverse members.212 And
yet, in the actual rate determinations, industry-wide rates were established
solely on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial webcasters.
It seems contradictory for the rate-setting body to admit market diversity on
the one hand and then attempt to set rates that “most” willing buyers and
willing sellers would have agreed to by refraining from identifying and
delineating the circumstances that make the market diverse.213 Furthermore,
since the CARP and the CRB each set their industry-wide rates solely with
reference to marketplace (“benchmark”) agreements between copyright owners
and larger webcasters, any shortcomings in the application of the willing
buyer/willing seller standard have no doubt been borne primarily by small and
noncommercial webcasters, whose unique circumstances essentially were

Such rates and terms shall distinguish among the different types of eligible
nonsubscription transmission services then in operation and shall include a minimum fee
for each type of service, such differences to be based on criteria including, but not limited
to, the quantity and nature of the use of the sound recordings and the degree to which use
of the service may substitute for or may promote the purchase of phonorecords by
consumers.
(emphasis added).
209. Id.
210. Id. If the criteria on which the CRB can distinguish webcasters are truly unlimited,
would not a public policy interest in protecting small and noncommercial webcasters be a
sufficient ground on which to make a distinction for purposes of setting a different rate?
211. For example: means of broadcasting, income, type of programming, average number of
listeners, number of channels/streams, average number of hours broadcast, available resources,
business structure, profitability, demographic of target audience, availability of advertising,
business growth projections/aspirations, etc.
212. See CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,087 (“In the hypothetical marketplace we
attempt to replicate, there would be significant variations, among both buyers and sellers, in terms
of sophistication, economic resources, business exigencies, and myriad other factors.”); see also
CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,244 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261)
(“Because of the diversity among the buyers and the sellers . . . one would expect ‘a range of
negotiated rates’ . . . .”).
213. Instead, the CRB appears to have placed the burden on the parties to make distinctions
between types of webcasters. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,089 n.9 (explaining that it
will not distinguish between small and large commercial webcasters because the parties did not
provide sufficient evidence on which to base such a distinction).
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unaccounted for.214 Such interpretation and application of the willing
buyer/willing seller standard seems pointedly unfair.
Another criticism is that, in applying the willing buyer/willing seller
standard, the CARP and CRB both assume the presence of a functioning
marketplace with reliable benchmarks from which fair rates for all participants
can be drawn.215 One commentator has argued that the existence of the
statutory licensing scheme itself “distorts the very market that it seeks to
replicate.”216 Similarly, another critic has called it “circular” to employ a
licensing scheme to set rates that would have been set in the absence of a
licensing scheme.217 The reality of the marketplace is that SoundExchange, on
behalf of the recording industry, can presently negotiate an industry-wide
royalty rate with full knowledge that, if negotiations with webcasters fall
through, a safety net of default rates (and so far, favorable rates) is the worst it
can do. This safety net is what arguably distorts the marketplace and prevents
its normal functioning by providing SoundExchange with the disincentive to
meaningfully negotiate with webcasters.218 Without a properly functioning
marketplace, the hypothetical marketplace of the willing buyer/willing seller
standard has no reference point. In other words, if the CRB’s goal is to
ascertain and set royalty rates at the “true value” of the underlying soundrecording right (assuming such a value can be determined), its current
approach to determining that “true value” is flawed by reference to a third
party’s “perceived value” of the underlying right, which is likely skewed by
self-interest.219
By far the most suggested solution to these criticisms of the willing
buyer/willing seller standard and its application is reversion back to the §
801(b)(1) policy guidelines. This move would better promote traditional

214. See CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,245 (adopting the Yahoo!/RIAA
agreement as its benchmark); CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,092 (adopting Dr. Pelcovits’
interactive webcasting market as its benchmark); Testimony of Michael Pelcovits, In re Digital
Performing Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2005-1 CRB
DTRA, at 11–12 (Copyright Royalty Bd. Oct. 2005) (referring only to agreements between
“major copyright owners” and major record label[s]).
215. See Fessler, supra note 200, at 418.
216. Id. at 421 (“The standard permits CARP to turn to marketplace agreements in fabricating
its hypothetical willing buyer and seller, when these agreements themselves are the product of
influences that would not exist absent the CARP, therefore not reflecting agreements that would
have been reached in a normal, free-flowing marketplace.”); see also id. at 400.
217. Jackson, supra note 60, at 476.
218. Fessler, supra note 200, at 419. But cf. CARP Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240,
45,245 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261)(explaining that the CARP found in its 2002
proceeding that the “RIAA’s perceived market power was tempered by the existence of the
statutory license, which, for purposes of negotiating a fair rate for use of sound recordings,
leveled the playing field.”).
219. Jackson, supra note 60, at 476.
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copyright goals by allowing for a more equitable balancing of the competing
interests of copyright owners, copyright users, and the public.220 The current
balance of these interests under the willing buyer/willing seller standard seems
tipped disproportionately in favor of copyright owners, with little regard for
the interests of copyright users and little assurance that the balance actually
benefits the public in any way.
A second suggested solution, broader in scope, is to replace the current
system with a tiered royalty rate scheme that would account for differing types
of webcasters.221 Such a standard might separate webcasters into categories
with assigned royalty rates that would increase as the webcaster’s listeningbase increased (similar to an ATH payment option)222 or perhaps as the
webcaster’s revenue increased.223 Such a scheme might allow small and
noncommercial webcasters to negotiate separate royalty rates with the
recording industry, which in effect would allow the market to determine the
tiers through voluntary party negotiation.224 On the other hand, Congress
could determine the tiers by passing legislation that sets separate rates for
different categories of webcasters.225 This type of tiered scheme would require
Congress to statutorily identify and define the different categories of
webcasters—a task neither it, the CRB, nor the parties to the rate
determinations have yet to accomplish.226
2. Removing Bias from the Royalty Determinations
A second problem with the current royalty rate-determination process is
that it is biased against Internet radio solely on the basis of technology.227
When it created the digital performance right for sound recordings in 1995,
Congress expressly exempted terrestrial radio from paying sound recording
royalties because of the promotional value radio has traditionally provided
record companies.228 Conversely, all forms of non-terrestrial radio (e.g.
Internet radio and satellite radio) have been subject to such royalties for at least

220. Fessler, supra note 200, at 400–401, 411 n.82; Jackson, supra note 60, at 478; Delibero,
supra note 91, at 112.
221. Kidd, supra note 26, at 367; CASTRO, supra note 20, at 10.
222. Kidd, supra note 26, at 367.
223. Delibero, supra note 91, at 110–11.
224. CASTRO, supra note 20, at 10.
225. Kidd, supra note 26, at 373–74.
226. See CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,089 n.9 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 380) (“Indeed, since none of the small commercial webcasters participating in this
proceeding provided helpful evidence about what demarcates a ‘small’ webcaster from other
webcasters at any given point in time.”).
227. CASTRO, supra note 20, at 1.
228. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3rd Cir. 2003); 17 U.S.C. §
114(d)(1)(A) (1995).
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a decade. Moreover, the actual amount of the sound recording royalties paid
by Internet radio greatly exceeds the amount typically paid by other radio
services that make similar digital transmissions.
As a result, some
commentators have labeled the current rate structure as “technology-biased” in
favor of non-Internet radio services, especially in favor of terrestrial radio.229
Several proposed solutions aim to eliminate this type of discrimination.
One commentator believes that if “promotional value” continues to be the
reason terrestrial radio is exempted from paying sound recording royalties,
Internet radio should also be exempted since it “provides far greater promotion
for aspiring musicians because of its greater geographic reach, as compared to
over the air radio.”230 A second commentator believes that terrestrial radio’s
original exemption was “solely a [sic] historical accident and the result of
tremendous lobbying power.”231 As such, she believes that Congress should
make terrestrial radio subject to the same royalties as Internet and satellite
radio.232 Moreover, she has suggested that terrestrial stations pay three percent
of their gross revenue as the royalty fee, 100 percent of which would go
directly to artists (as opposed to the fifty-fifty split between record companies
and artists under the current § 114).233 Finally, a third commentator has
proposed that Congress take an “all-or-nothing approach” to the issue, which
entails either exempting all forms of radio from the payment of sound
recording royalties or subjecting all forms of radio to the same rate, regardless
of the medium used to transmit the recordings.234 Without the universal
application of royalties to all forms of radio, it is argued that exempt stations
will have a competitive advantage over non-exempt stations and that copyright
owners will be unfairly compensated as a result.235 Therefore, it is suggested
that Congress “promote technology-neutral policies to ensure a fair and
competitive market for all forms of radio.”236
Moreover, Internet and satellite royalties for the same performance right
are calculated under different standards. Royalties for the former are
calculated under the willing buyer/willing seller standard, while royalties for

229. See generally Anthony L. Soudatt & Natalie Sulimani, Net Radio Royalty Rates,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 2008, 2–4, 10–11, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?
id=1201864417399; CASTRO, supra note 20, at 8.
230. Soudatt & Sulimani, supra note 229, at 10.
231. Gigi B. Sohn, Presentation to the New Media and the Market place of Ideas Conference,
Boston University College of Communication: Six Steps to Digital Copyright Sanity: Reforming
a Pre-VCR law for a YouTube World (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/
gbsohn-speech-20071026.pdf.
232. Id.
233. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2) (2000).
234. CASTRO, supra note 20, at 9.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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the latter are calculated under the policy objectives of § 801(b)(1).237 Under
the willing buyer/willing seller standard, the CRB determined that commercial
webcasters should pay under a per-performance metric from 2006 to 2010,
with no alternative payment option; but under the § 801(b)(1) standard, the
CRB more recently determined that satellite radio stations should pay six
percent to eight percent of their gross revenue from 2007 to 2012 for use of the
same royalties.238 The main reason satellite radio’s rate structure is more
forgiving appears to be the different standards.239 One commentator has
pointed out that the main difference in § 801’s policy-based standard (when
compared to the willing buyer/willing seller standard) is the explicit element of
“fairness.”240 Thus, to completely address the discrimination issue, Congress
not only must equally apply exempt or non-exempt status to all forms of radio,
but it must ensure that the royalties these stations pay (under a non-exempt
scenario) are determined under the same standard.
In fact, terrestrial radio’s exemption from the payment of digital
performance royalties for sound recordings may be short-lived. On December
18, 2007, the Performance Rights Act was introduced to the House of
Representatives to “provide parity in radio performing rights.”241 This Act is
addressed more completely in Part V.B.2 below.
In sum, the current rate-determination process is plagued by two
fundamental problems. The first is the standard by which webcaster royalties
are determined. The second involves discrimination against Internet radio
solely on the basis of technology. Any long-term solution to the Internet radio
controversy should address both of these issues.
V. SURVIVAL OPTIONS FOR WEBCASTERS
Webcasters have responded in a number of ways to the CRB’s new royalty
scheme. On March 20, 2007, webcasters filed various motions for rehearing,
reconsideration, and clarification of the CRB’s March 2, 2007 initial
determination. The CRB denied all such motions on April 16, 2007,
explaining that the issues and arguments raised by the webcasters had either
been addressed in its initial determination or were not significant enough to
237. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(B) (2000) with § 114(f)(2)(B) and § 801(b)(1).
238. Kurt Hanson, CRB Sets Royalty Rate for Satellite Radio: 6% of Revenues Now, Rising to
8%, RAIN, Dec. 5, 2007, http://textpattern.kurthanson.com/crb/110/crb-sets-royalty-rate-forsatellite-radio-6-of-revenues-now-rising-to-8.
239. Id. SoundExchange explained in a press release that “due to a federal law requiring that
any new royalty rate avoid creating an overly ‘disruptive’ impact on the satellite services, the
CRB reduced the royalty from the benchmark [thirteen] percent to six percent in the first two
years of the term, with a gradual increase to [eight] percent in 2012.” Id.
240. Fessler, supra note 200, at 422.
241. See H.R. 4789, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Rep. Howard Berman); see also infra
Part V.B.2.
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warrant rehearing.242 Since then, webcasters have been forced to pursue other
options, such as appeal, legislative remedies, direct negotiation with
SoundExchange, and the possibility of relocating operations abroad. This part
addresses the likelihood of success of each of these options.
A.

Appeal

One option being pursued by webcasters is appeal of the CRB’s rate
determination to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.243 The Court of Appeals will only deem unlawful and set
aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary and
capricious, (2) contrary to constitutional law, (3) in excess of either statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, (4) without observance of the requisite
procedures, (5) unsupported by substantial evidence, or (6) unwarranted by the
facts, but only if the facts are subject to a trial de novo.244
Though webcasters filed their appeals in June of 2007, little progress has
been made thus far. Presently, the parties’ briefs are due on the following
dates: February 25, 2008 for webcasters; April 25, 2008 for the CRB; and May
15, 2008 for SoundExchange and for the Department of Justice, which is
defending the CRB in the proceedings.245 Reply briefs are due on June 12,
2008.246 Under this timeline, it is projected that oral arguments will not be
held until autumn of 2008, with a decision coming sometime in late 2008 or
early 2009.247
Most recently, webcasters filed three separate briefs with the Court of
Appeals.248 Large and small webcasters jointly filed one brief; various
commercial broadcast groups filed a second; and several noncommercial
broadcast groups filed a third.249 Together, webcasters’ briefs raised roughly

242. See In re Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings,
Docket No. 2005-1 CRB DTRA (Copyright Royalty Bd. Apr. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2005-1/motion-denial.pdf (denying motion for rehearing).
243. See 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(1) (2000) (allowing appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit within thirty days after the CRB’s opinion is published in the Federal
Register).
244. 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(3) (2000); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000).
245. Soudatt & Sulimani, supra note 229, at 10; Posting by David Oxenford to Broadcast
Law Blog, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-a-year-after-the-webcasting
-royalty-decision-no-settlement-appeal-briefs-filed.html (Mar. 15, 2008) (on file with author).
246. Soudatt & Sulimani, supra note 229, at 10.
247. Id.
248. Oxenford, supra note 245. A fourth brief was filed at the same time by Royalty Logic
(not a webcaster), challenging SoundExchange’s sole right to collect digital performance
royalties. Id.
249. Id. On appeal, large webcasters are represented by Digital Media Association; small
webcasters include AccuRadio, Radioio, Radio Paradise, and Digitally Imported Radio;
commercial broadcast groups include Bonneville, the NAB and the National Religious
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six issues criticizing the CRB’s 2007 rate determination.250 One criticism is
that the CRB failed to address webcasters’ proposal that they be allowed to pay
a flat royalty fee, similar to the one collected by performing rights
organizations in exchange for the license to publicly performing musical
works.251 Similarly, noncommercial stations claimed that the CRB should
have adopted a flat fee comparable to one that had previously been negotiated
between SoundExchange and NPR.252 A third criticism concerns the CRB’s
determination that small commercial webcasters did not really care about
obtaining a percentage-of-revenue rate structure “despite consistent testimony
that the fee was necessary to their survival.”253 A fourth criticism is that the
CRB adopted the $500 per-channel minimum fee without any evidence that the
fee accurately reflects SoundExchange’s collection costs.254 A fifth complaint
is that the CRB adopted SoundExchange’s “adjusted” interactive webcastingservices benchmark despite (1) the fact that a similar benchmark had been
proposed and abandoned by SoundExchange in a recent royalty-rate
proceeding against satellite radio broadcasters and (2) the existence of an
agreement between the recording industry and Yahoo! (similar to the one
relied on by the CARP in 2002), which webcasters believe is a more analogous
benchmark.255 Finally, webcasters argue that the CRB was not required to
adopt a specific proposal advanced by the parties (which the CRB essentially
did, in favor of SoundExchange); instead, webcasters argue that the Copyright
Royalty Judges should have considered all of the relevant evidence before
them with the ultimate goal of crafting the most appropriate royalty rate (or
rates) overall.256
According to attorney David Oxenford, the “principal point” raised on
appeal by small commercial webcasters was the CRB’s failure to adopt a
percentage-of-revenue rate structure.257 To win this argument, it appears that
small commercial webcasters will have to show that the CRB’s rejection of
this rate structure was either arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by
substantial evidence. However, after reading the CRB’s decision, it is hard to
imagine that webcasters can meet this high burden of proof. First, although
small commercial webcasters may argue that expert witness testimony
consistently demonstrated that their survival depends on a percentage-of-

Broadcasters Association; and noncommercial groups include NPR, college broadcasters, and
noncommercial religious broadcasters. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Oxenford, supra note 245.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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revenue rate structure, the CRB addressed the issue in detail. It explained that
the small commercial webcasters’ only witness conceded that, in “requiring” a
percentage-of-revenue structure, small webcasters were ultimately worried
about staying in business.258 Further, the CRB reasoned that, even if it decided
to treat “small” webcasters differently, there was a problem with defining
“small” webcasters: the Judges refused to do so in the absence of evidence
offered by the parties.259 Moreover, the Judges found that small commercial
webcasters had failed to provide evidence (aside from assertion) that such a
structure was actually required for survival.260 After rejecting the percentageof-revenue structure, the CRB proceeded to give a number of reasons
supporting its choice of a per-performance fee structure over a percentage-ofrevenue structure.261 Overall, the CRB’s treatment of this issue does not
appear to be arbitrary and capricious since its reasoning is detailed and at least
plausibly supports its conclusion. Moreover, there seems to be enough
evidence in the record, based on the CRB’s treatment of witness testimony, to
support their rejection of a percentage-of-revenue structure.
Webcasters’ other claims also are likely to run into similar problems with
meeting the high standard of proof. The CRB considered a sizeable amount of
written and oral evidence from all parties involved. It seems unlikely in the
end that the Appellate Court will find that the Judges’ decisions on these other
issues lack sufficient evidentiary support or are arbitrary and capricious in
nature. Even if the Appellate Court does find in favor of webcasters on a
certain issue, the likely result will be a remand to the CRB to better explain or
support its finding. Furthermore, webcasters have a financial incentive to
resolve these issues sooner rather than later; it would be risky to rely solely on
the judicial process for relief when there is no guarantee of a satisfactory
resolution. Accordingly, webcasters have been seeking other solutions in
addition to appeal.
B.

Proposed Legislation
1. The Internet Radio Equality Act

Whereas their success in the judicial arena seems unlikely, webcasters
appear to have a much better chance of securing an effective legislative
remedy. Soon after the CRB’s initial decision, webcasters around the country

258. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,088 (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380) (May 1,
2007).
259. Id. at 24,088–89. While the CRB may have made the distinction between small and
large webcasters on its own, it does not appear that it was affirmatively required to do so under 17
U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B).
260. CRB Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,089.
261. Id.
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began organizing in hopes of presenting Congress with unified opposition to
the CRB’s ruling.262 Webcasters started campaigning to raise awareness of the
issues facing Internet radio and encouraged listeners to contact their
Congressmen for support.263 By April 26, 2007—even before the CRB’s final
determination came down—webcasters had found a voice in Congress. On
that date, Congressmen Jay Inslee, a Democrat from Washington, and Don
Manzullo, a Republican from Illinois, introduced The Internet Radio Equality
Act (“IREA”) to the House of Representatives.264 Shortly thereafter, a
companion bill was introduced in the Senate by Senators Ron Wyden, a
Democrat from Oregon, and Sam Brownback, a Republican from Kansas.265
The stated purpose of both bills is: “To nullify the March 2, 2007,
determination of the Copyright Royalty Judges with respect to webcasting, to
modify the basis for making such a determination, and for other purposes.”266
The IREA would allow commercial webcasters to choose between paying
seven and a half percent of their gross revenue or $0.0033 per ATH for the
remainder of the current term (i.e., until 2010).267 Noncommercial webcasters
would pay only one and a half times the rates they paid during 2004.268 But
most significantly, the IREA would amend the Copyright Act by striking the
willing buyer/willing seller standard and reinstating § 801(b)(1)’s policy-based
standard as the guidepost for determining future royalty rates.269
One of the questions lurking behind the IREA is whether or not Congress
is serious about enacting it. In hindsight, the IREA looks very similar to the
Internet Radio Fairness Act (“IRFA”), which was proposed in 2002 by one of
the same congressmen who introduced the IREA.270 The IRFA was ultimately
tabled and succeeded by the SWSA, which provided only short-term relief to
webcasters while ignoring the flawed willing buyer/willing seller standard.271
It is unclear whether the IREA is destined for the same fate. On one hand,
Congress may simply be using the IREA as a blunt instrument to pressure
SoundExchange into meaningful negotiations with webcasters. John Simson
of SoundExchange seems to agree. He thinks it would “go against common
sense” for Congress to legislatively overrule the CRB’s rates, given that
Congress specifically created the CRB to utilize its expertise in making such

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See generally SaveNetRadio, http://www.savenetradio.org.
Id.
Internet Radio Equality Act, H.R. 2060, 110th Cong. (2007).
Internet Radio Equality Act of 2007, S. 1353, 110th Cong. (2007).
H.R. 2060, 110th Cong. (2007); accord S. 1353, 110th Cong. (2007).
H.R. 2060, 110th Cong. (2007).
Id.
Id.
See H.R. 5285, 107th Cong. (2002) (introduced by Rep. Jay Inslee).
See supra Part III.A.
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decisions.272 On the other hand, perhaps the controversy surrounding these
rate determinations under the willing buyer/willing seller standard has actually
forced Congress to reconsider the underlying problem it originally pinpointed
in the IRFA.
By last count, the IREA had 145 co-sponsors in the House and five in the
Senate.273 It remains true that the introduction of a bill like the IREA is only
the first step in the legislative process. Such bills must make it through
committees that deliberate, investigate, and revise them before being sent on to
a general debate. Most bills never make it out of committee.274
2. The Performance Rights Act
More recently, on December 18, 2007, the Performance Rights Act was
introduced to the House of Representatives by Representative Howard
Berman.275 A companion bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Patrick
Leahy.276 If passed, these bills would subject terrestrial radio to the same
digital performance royalty for the transmission of sound recordings that all
other forms of radio have been subject to since the mid-to-late 1990s.277
Notably, the Performance Rights Act would accord separate rates for small,
noncommercial, educational, and religious terrestrial broadcasters.278
SoundExchange has apparently welcomed the bill, which would provide
another source of income to its artists and record labels.279 Thus far, the
Performance Rights Act has five co-sponsors in the House and three in the
Senate.280
Interestingly, an opposition resolution titled the Local Radio Freedom Act
also has been proposed in the House.281 Its purpose is to prevent disruption of
the mutually beneficial relationship that has existed historically between

272. All Access Music Group, supra note 34.
273. GovTrack.us, H.R. 2060: Internet Radio Equality Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=h110-2060; GovTrack.us, S. 1315: Internet Radio Equality Act of 2007,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1353.
274. GovTrack.us, H.R. 2060: Internet Radio Equality Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=h110-2060.
275. See H.R. 4789, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Rep. Howard L. Berman).
276. See S. 2500, 110th Cong. (2007).
277. S. 2500, 110th Cong. (2007); OpenCongress.org, H.R.4789 Performance Rights Act,
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-h4789/show; OpenCongress.org, S.2500 Performance
Rights Act, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-s2500/show.
278. S. 2500, 110th Cong. (2007).
279. Bill to Levy ‘Performance Fee’ Introduced; Conaway, Green Oppose, RADIO WORLD
NEWSPAPER, Dec. 21, 2007, http://www.rwonline.com/pages/s.0100/t.10383.html.
280. OpenCongress.org, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-h4789/show (last visited Feb.
11, 2008).
281. See H.R. Con. Res. 244, 110th Cong. (2007).
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terrestrial radio stations and record companies.282 Putting its weight behind
this resolution will certainly be the National Association of Broadcasters
(“NAB”), a traditional lobbying power. Accordingly, the resolution already
has 140 co-sponsors in the House.283 It should be interesting to see which
lobby, the RIAA or the NAB, wins this battle in the end. In the meantime, the
fact that a bill like the Performance Rights Act has actually been proposed
demonstrates that Congress is at least aware of the potential unfairness of
subjecting non-terrestrial radio stations to performance royalties simply
because their broadcast media differs from that employed by terrestrial radio
stations.
C. Direct Negotiation with SoundExchange
For the moment, the most immediate (and provisional) solution for
webcasters is direct negotiation with SoundExchange, which has remained at
the table under pressure from Congress. For instance, SoundExchange and the
Digital Media Association (“DiMA”), which represents large commercial
webcasters, reached a settlement agreement on August 23, 2007 regarding the
CRB’s new minimum fee requirement.284 Recall that the CRB’s rates require
all webcasters to pay a minimum annual fee of $500 per station or channel in
addition to higher rates. This minimum fee itself could drive webcasters with
numerous channels or stations out of business (e.g., Pandora, which creates
unique stations for each individual listener).285 Under this settlement
agreement, SoundExchange agreed to cap the per-channel minimum fee at
$50,000 per service.286 DiMA called this agreement an “important first step”

282. H.R. Con. Res. 244, 110th Cong. (2007). Supporters of this bill must assume that
terrestrial radio influences the physical sale of music more so than Internet radio. However, there
seems to be little credible evidence supporting this assumption. Instead, common sense seems to
suggest that Internet radio would influence just as many (if not more) physical sales as terrestrial
radio, especially since Internet radio providers often provide listeners with direct links to stores
from which to purchase the music they are hearing—something of which terrestrial radio is
simply incapable. Supporters of the bill, who argue that any support Internet radio provides to
physical record sales is diminished because people steal the music they listen to online, should
consider the distinction between downloading MP3’s and copying music from streaming music.
The former, which is not associated with Internet radio broadcasting, is more prevalent and is
generally blamed (with little support) as the cause for declining record sales. The latter, while
possible, is less widespread and certainly cannot credibly be blamed as any significant source of
less record sales.
283. OpenCongress.org, H.Con.Res.244: Supporting the Local Radio Freedom Act,
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-hc244/show.
284. See Press Release, Digital Media Association (Aug. 23, 2007), http://www.digmedia.org/
content/release.cfm?id=7229&content=pr.
285. See Van Buskirk, supra note 29.
286. See Digital Media Association, supra note 284.
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in negotiations, implying that it still hopes to coax some kind of concession
from SoundExchange regarding the CRB’s per-performance rates.287
Regarding smaller webcasters, SoundExchange has offered to extend some
of the terms of 2002’s SWSA for the remainder of this licensing period.288
This offer came only after members of Congress directly asked
SoundExchange to negotiate in good faith with smaller webcasters.289 Under
the proposal, small webcasters would pay fees of ten percent of all gross
revenue up to $250,000, and twelve percent for all gross revenue above that
amount. However, there is a catch: to qualify for the offer, webcasters first
must meet revenue and usage cap requirements. Only webcasters who make
less than $1.25 million and broadcast less than five million tuning hours are
eligible to accept the offer.290
Many small webcasters were insulted by this offer from SoundExchange,
particularly by the revenue and usage caps. One criticism of this offer is that
the caps “do not permit small webcasters to grow their businesses—artificially
condemning them to be forever small, at best minimally profitable operations,
in essence little more than hobbies.”291 Jake Ward of SaveNetRadio agrees,
adding that SoundExchange’s proposal would turn Internet radio into “a lousy
long-term business.”292 Another shortcoming of SoundExchange’s offer is that
it does not allow webcasters to play all recorded music for their ten to twelve
percent revenue payments (as did the terms of the SWSA).293 Instead,
SoundExchange’s reduced rate applies only to music produced by
SoundExchange artists. Thus, playing music from non-SoundExchange artists
would require payment at CRB rates.294 Finally, and maybe most importantly,
SoundExchange’s offer is only good through 2010, when payments will again
revert to CRB default rates.295
SoundExchange’s offer has had mixed success. As of September 18, 2007,
twenty-four small webcasters had accepted the proposal and signed individual
287. Digital Media Association, supra note 284.
288. Press Release, SoundExchange, SoundExchange Extends Offer to Small Webcasters,
(May 23, 2007), http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “News” hyperlink, then follow “SX
News” hyperlink).
289. Id.
290. Press Release, SoundExchange, Sound Exchange Offers Small Webcasters Discounted
Rate Agreement Through 2010 (Aug. 21, 2007), http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “News”
hyperlink, then follow “SX News” hyperlink).
291. David Oxenford, Another Offer From SoundExchange—Still Not a Solution,
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-another-offer-from-soundexchangestill-not-a-solution.html (Aug. 22, 2007).
292. Press Release, SaveNetRadio, Proposal Would Decimate Internet Radio Industry (May
22, 2007), http://www.savenetradio.org/press_room/press_releases/070522-rejection.pdf.
293. Oxenford, supra note 291.
294. Id.
295. See SoundExchange, supra note 290.
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agreements with SoundExchange.296 On the other hand, many small
webcasters have rejected the proposal outright as “unrealistic and
unacceptable.”297 Overall, while direct negotiation with SoundExchange—at
least under its latest proposal—may offer some immediate relief for qualified
small webcasters, it does not provide a long-term solution to the royalty rate
controversy.
D. Relocating Operations Abroad
Some webcasters, as an alternative to dealing with SoundExchange or
pursuing judicial and legislative remedies, have considered relocating their
webcasting operations outside the United States to avoid the CRB’s new
rates.298 However, as attorney David Oxenford points out, this would not be a
viable option for webcasters who plan to continue streaming music to U.S.
listeners; CRB royalties still apply to such streams.299 In fact, U.S. copyright
law extends to all incoming foreign radio streams, which is why many foreign
webcasters have purposely stopped streaming to U.S. residents after the CRB
reached its decision in 2007.300 Only if a webcaster is willing to leave the U.S.
market behind is relocating abroad a viable option. However, moving beyond
the reach of the CRB and U.S. copyright laws does not mean that a webcaster
will be free from royalty obligations to foreign performing rights
organizations.301 The only hope is that these rates might be more affordable
than those imposed by the CRB.
E.

Conclusion

Together, the IREA and the Performance Rights Act offer the best longterm solution for webcasters. Passage of the IREA would replace the willing
buyer/willing seller standard with policy objectives that would better promote
traditional notions of copyright law. Passage of the Performance Rights Act
would begin to address the current system’s technological bias against Internet
radio by leveling the digital performance playing field. However, it remains to
be seen whether Congress is willing to amend copyright law again and
legislatively overrule the CRB’s new rates, or whether it is just entertaining the
idea to appease webcasters and pressure SoundExchange into meaningful

296. Press Release, SaveNetRadio, Small Webcasters Reject SoundExchange License (Sept.
19, 2007), http://www.savenetradio.org/press_room/press_releases/070919-reject.pdf.
297. Id.
298. David Oxenford, What Next for Internet Radio In Light of the Copyright Royalty Board
Decision, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-what-next-for-internet-radioin-light-of-the-copyright-royalty-board-decision-html (Mar. 7, 2007) (on file with author).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
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negotiation. Further, it is uncertain how Congress will react to the clashing
RIAA and NAB lobbies concerning imposition of performance royalties on the
traditionally exempt terrestrial radio industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress has a second chance to repair a determination process that has
caused an ongoing royalty war between the Internet radio and recording
industries. Part of the problem is the willing buyer/willing seller standard,
which has twice failed to produce fair and competitive royalty rates and has
twice threatened to drive small and noncommercial webcasters out of business
despite strong public policy reasons for protecting these businesses. Another
part of the problem is that the current system is technology-biased against
Internet radio, holding it to higher standards than terrestrial and satellite radio
when the only difference between the parties’ uses of sound recordings is the
medium by which recordings are transmitted. A long-term solution to this
ongoing controversy will address both the faulty standard and the historically
disparate treatment of radio media with regard to sound recording performance
royalties. Attempts to address both issues are presently before Congress in the
form of the Internet Radio Equality Act and the Performance Rights Act,
respectively. If these bills are passed, Congress will have taken a large step
toward creating a sound recording royalty scheme that simultaneously
promotes innovation and growth in the Internet radio industry and that fairly
compensates performing artists and sound recording owners for creating music
and sharing it with the world.
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